that nous governs the world, or by our own saying that thereis reason in the world, by which we mean that reason is the soul ofthe world, inhabits it, and is immanent in it, as it own, innermostnature, its universal. (EL-GSH Addition 1 to 24)
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Throughout his work, Hegel strove to address and correct the problematic dualisms of modern philosophy, Kantian and otherwise, typically by drawing upon the resources of ancient philosophy, particularly Aristotle. Hegel everywhere insists that reason and freedom are historical achievements, not natural givens. His dialectical-speculative procedure is grounded in the principle of immanence, that is, in assessing claims always according to their own internal criteria. Taking skepticism seriously, he contends that we cannot presume any truths that have not passed the test of experience.
It was Kant's Critical Philosophy that provided what Hegel took as the definitive modern articulation of the divisions that must be overcome.[70] This led to his engagement with the philosophical programs of Fichte and Schelling, as well as his attention to Spinoza and the Pantheism controversy.[71][c] The influence of Johann Gottfried von Herder, however, would lead Hegel to a qualified rejection of the universality claimed by the Kantian program in favor of a more culturally, linguistically, and historically informed account of reason.[72]
The relation of Hegel's philosophy of right to modern liberalism is complex. He sees liberalism as a valuable and characteristic expression of the modern world. However, it carries the danger within itself to undermine its own values. This self-destructive tendency may be avoided by measuring "the subjective goals of individuals by a larger objective and collective good." Moral values, then, have only a "limited place in the total scheme of things."[193] Yet, although it is not without reason that Hegel is widely regarded as a major proponent of what Isaiah Berlin would later term positive liberty, he was just as "unwavering and unequivocal" in his defense of negative liberty.[194]
In other words, according to Hegel's philosophical interpretation, Christianity does not require faith in any doctrine that is not fully justified by reason. What is left, then, is the religious community, free to minister to individual needs and to celebrate the absolute freedom of spirit.[222]
"History," Frederick Beiser writes, "is central to Hegel's conception of philosophy." Philosophy is only possible "if it is historical, only if the philosopher is aware of the origins, context, and development of his doctrines." In this 1993 essay, titled "Hegel's Historicism," Beiser declares this to be "nothing less than a revolution in the history of philosophy."[232] In a 2011 monograph, however, Beiser excludes Hegel from his treatment of the German historicist tradition for the reason that Hegel is more interested in the philosophy of history than in the epistemological project of justifying its status as a science.[233] Moreover, against the relativistic implications of historicism narrowly construed, Hegel's metaphysics of spirit supplies a telos, internal to history itself, in terms of which progress can be measured and assessed. This is the self-consciousness of freedom. The more that awareness of this essential freedom of spirit permeates a culture, the more advanced Hegel claims it to be.[234]
By confining the dialectic to history, the dominant French readings of Jean Wahl, Alexandre Kojève, and Jean Hyppolite effectively presented Hegel as providing "a philosophical anthropology instead of a general metaphysics."[289] This reading took the topic of desire as its focal point of intervention.[290] A major theme was that "a reason that seeks to be all-inclusive falsifies reality by suppressing or repressing its 'other.'"[291] Although it cannot be attributed entirely to Kojève, this reading of Hegel shaped the thought and interpretations of thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Claude Levi-Strauss, Jacques Lacan, and George Bataille.[292]
As Dewey himself describes the attraction, "There were, however, also 'subjective' reasons for the appeal that Hegel's thought made to me; it supplied a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject-matter could satisfy."[307] Dewey accepted much of Hegel's account of history and society, but rejected his (probably incorrect) conception of Hegel's account of absolute knowing.[308]
Two philosophers, John McDowell and Robert Brandom (sometimes referred to as the "Pittsburgh Hegelians"), constitute, per Bernstein, the third moment of Hegel's influence on pragmatism.[309] However, while openly acknowledging the influence, neither claims to explicate Hegel's views according to his own self-understanding.[ao] In addition, each is avowedly influenced by Wilfrid Sellars.[311] McDowell is particularly interested in dispelling the "myth of the given," the dichotomy between concept and intuition, whereas Brandom is concerned mostly to develop Hegel's social account of reason-giving and normative implication.[312] These appropriations of Hegel's thought are two among several "non-metaphysical" readings.[313]
Writing in 2005 for an Anglophone audience, Frederick Beiser states that the status of Hegel's metaphysics is "probably the most disputed question in Hegel scholarship."[314] Some scholars favor a religious interpretation of Hegel's metaphysics as an attempt to justify Christian beliefs through reason.[314]
If Hegel's philosophy is metaphysics, Beiser states that these philosophers believe it is "doomed to obsolescence" as a "bankrupt enterprise" now that Kant has shown the impossibility of determining unconditioned knowledge through pure reason in his Critique.[316]
Being-in-itself (an sich)"In order to comprehend what development is,- what may be called two different states must be distinguished. The first is what is known as capacity, power, what I call being-in-itself (potentia); the second principle is that of being-for-itself, actuality (actus). If we say, for example, that man is by nature rational, we would mean that he has reason only inherently or in embryo: in this sense, reason, understanding, imagination, will, are possessed from birth or even from the mother's womb. But while the child only has capacities or the actual possibility of reason, it is just the same as if he had no reason; reason does not yet exist in him since he cannot yet do anything rational, and has no rational consciousness. Thus what man is at first implicitly becomes explicit . . . ." Lectures on the History of Philosophy 20-21.
This process is evident in Hegel's omnipresent triadicstructures. For Hegel, though, this is no mere formalism, i.e., the externalimposition of structure, rather it is the reflection of the internal and necessarystructure of Reason itself (and since it is solelyReason which is actual, Hegel's Logic - wherein theconcrete structure of reason is revealed - is metaphysics).
With respect to Logic: "Hegel's primary object in his dialectic isto establish the existence of a logical connection between the variouscategories which are involved in the constitution of experience. . . . [A]nycategory, if scrutunised with sufficient care and attention, is found to lead toanother, and to involve it, in such a manner that an attempt to use the first ofany subject while we refuse to use the second of the same subject results in acontradiction. The category thus reached leads on in a similar way to athird, and the process continues until at last we reach the goal of thedialectic in a category which betrays no instability [viz., the Absolute Idea].. . . . .The dialectic process . . . obeys a definite law. The reason of this is atany point the finite category explicitly before us stands in a definiterelationship to the complete and absolute idea which is implicit in ourconsciousness. . . . Thus the first and deepest cause of the dialectic movementis the instability of all finite categories, due to their imperfect [i.e.,limited] nature. The immediate result of this instability is the production ofcontradictions [and] . . . to the existence of the contradiction we owe theadvance of the dialectic.. . . . .[However,] the method, by which Hegel proceeds from on category to another inhis Logic, is not the same throughout, but changes materially as the processadvances." J.M.E. McTaggart, Studiesin the Hegelian Dialectic 1, 4, 106.
"The Idea is the concept in so far as the conceptgives reality and existence to itself. . . . The Idea, or reason, or truth, is theconcept become concrete, the unity of subject and object, of form and content." T.M. Knox, Translator's Foreword, Philosophy of Right ix.
". . . logic is to be understood as the system of purereason, as the realm of pure thought. . . . It can therefore be said that this content isthe exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and afinite mind." Introduction, Science of Logic 50.
Negative". . . reason is negative and dialectical,because it resolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing . . . ." Preface to the First Edition, Scienceof Logic 28. See "Dialectic".
"The position taken up by the notion isthat of absolute idealism. Philosophy is a knowledge through notions because itsees that what on other grades of consciousness is taken to have Being, and tobe naturally or immediately independent, is but a constituent stage in the Idea.. . . [T]he notion is a true concrete; for the reason that it involves Being andEssence, and the total wealth of these two spheres with them, merged in theunity of thought." Logic 160Note.
". . . reason is negative and dialectical,because it resolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing; it is positivebecause it generates the universal and comprehends the particular therein. . . . Butreason in its truth is spirit . . . ." Preface to the First Edition, Scienceof Logic 28. 2ff7e9595c
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